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Disproportionate Insider Control and Firm Performance 
 
1. Introduction 
Equity structures that deviate from the “one share, one vote” principle, and hence allow 
insiders to exercise voting power disproportionate to their economic interest, are widely seen as 
problematic in the popular press1 and academic literature (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002; Lins, 2003; 
Gompers et al., 2010). While insider ownership mitigates the classic Type I principal-agent 
conflict by aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, high levels of insider ownership, 
and particularly disproportionate insider control, can give rise to Type II agency conflicts between 
controlling and minority shareholders, where controlling shareholders may use their dominant 
position to extract perquisites at the cost of minority shareholders (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
The present study examines the association of disproportionate insider control and firms’ 
financial and operating performance in a sample of U.S. dual-class firms.2 The expected 
association of disproportionate insider control and firm performance is not unambiguous. On the 
one hand, disproportionate insider control allows insiders to avoid the pro rata economic 
consequences of their actions, which enhances their ability to extract excess rents from the firm at 
the expense of minority shareholders.3 Insiders ability to expropriate wealth from the firm at a 
                                                     
1
 See, for example, “Out of Control,” The Economist, September 20, 2014. 
2
 In a typical firm with a dual-class equity structure, one class of shares possesses enhanced voting rights relative to a 
second, inferior class of shares, while both classes generally have equal or similar cash flow rights. An alternate equity 
structure that can cause a divergence of voting and cash flow rights, more common among European and Asian firms, 
are pyramid structures. In firms with pyramid structures, the ultimate ownership of a firm runs through a chain of 
ownership of intermediate corporations. For instance, one entity (A) may hold 60% ownership in another entity (B), 
which in turn hold 60% ownership in a third (C). In this case, entity A exercises 60% control over C due to its majority 
control over entity B, but only owns 36% of the cash flow rights of entity C. 
3 For instance, if insiders in a firm governed by the one share/one vote principle own 62.4% of the equity—hence 
commanding 62.4% of the vote—and they award $1,000,000 in excess compensation to a family member, then 62.4% 
of the cost of this misappropriation is shouldered by the insiders themselves. In the median dual-class firm in our 
sample, however, insiders command 62.4% of the firm’s voting rights, but only own 24.3% of its cash-flow rights. 
Therefore, at the expense of outside shareholders, the cost of the consumption of private benefits is greatly reduced. 
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lower cost in turn may negatively impact firm performance. A body of research demonstrates 
controlling shareholders in dual-class firms are likely to take actions that benefit themselves at the 
expense of outside shareholders (Masulis et al., 2009). 
On the other hand, insiders who establish disproportionate control rights may also do so 
out of a desire to maintain involvement with the firm for the long run. The presence of committed 
insiders is associated with more effective monitoring of management (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), 
a long-term perspective on generating value (Stein, 1988; 1989), and lower contracting costs 
(Andres, 2008). Moreover, committed insiders may be significantly motivated by non-pecuniary 
benefits of control, which are stronger motivators than financial rewards alone (Kandel and Lazear, 
1992; Davis et al., 1997; Bennedson et al., 2007). Given this complicated picture, the net effect of 
disproportionate insider control on firm performance is an open question. 
We are motivated to examine the issue for several important reasons. First and foremost, 
as discussed above, the direction of the association between disproportionate insider control and 
firm performance is not obvious. At the same time, the existent evidence is surprisingly limited. 
Studies examining the effects of disproportionate insider control have almost exclusively focused 
on firm value, typically operationalized by Tobin’s Q (Claessens et al., 2002; Lins, 2003; Harvey 
et al., 2004; Gompers et al., 2010). The dearth of studies examining the nexus between 
disproportionate insider control and accounting-based firm performance, rather than market-based 
firm value, constitutes a significant gap in the literature, because accounting performance reflects 
past performance, whereas market-based measures capture expectations of future performance. 
Accounting profitability and market performance hence represent distinct dimensions that have 
limited empirical overlap (Gentry and Shen, 2010). 
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How disproportionate insider control affects firm performance appears to be a particularly 
timely question as well, because the number of firms going public with equity structures that 
provide for a divergence of voting and cash flow rights is growing both in the United States (e.g., 
Google, LinkedIn, Facebook, Snap)4 and internationally (e.g., Manchester United, Alibaba, 
Baidu). In addition, the establishment of disproportionate control has been recently facilitated in a 
number of European countries through legislation providing for shares with enhanced voting rights 
for long-term shareholders, so called “loyalty shares.”5 Equity structures that enable 
disproportionate insider control hence appear to be a phenomenon on the rise. 
We examine the association of disproportionate insider control and firm performance in a 
comprehensive hand-collected sample of U. S. dual-class firms in the 2000 to 2014 period. In our 
first test, we re-examine the association between disproportionate insider control and Tobin’s Q. 
We then examine four common accounting-based performance measures, return on investment 
(ROI), return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and return on sales (ROS). In extended 
analyses, we additionally use firm efficiency (Demerjian et al., 2012) as an alternative proxy for 
firm operating performance.  
In our analyses, we incorporate controls for the endogeneity of ownership structure 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 1999). We follow recent literature (e.g., Masulis et 
al., 2009; Jordan et al., 2014; McGuire et al., 2014) and employ propensity score matching (PSM) 
to create a sample of dual-class and matched single-class firms. We further employ a two-stage 
                                                     
4
 Dual-class firms comprised about 6% of all U.S. public firms in the 1995-2002 period (Gompers et al., 2010), but 
now account for 8.7% of companies included in the Russell 3000 index (Equilar, 2015). In 2013, 13.6% of all U.S. 
firms conducting an initial public offering (IPO) adopted a dual-class structure of stock (Equilar, 2015). 
5
 In France, dual-class equity structures are likely to become more common with passage of the Florange Act in 2014 
which provides for the automatic granting of double-voting rights to registered shares held for at least two years. ISS 
(2015) estimates that more than fifty percent of French companies now issue shares entitled to double voting rights. 
In 2014, Italy also passed a similar law enabling the creation of loyalty shares.  
5 
 
least squares instrumental variables approach with the goal of controlling for unobservable firm 
characteristics which may be associated with disproportionate insider control and performance. In 
addition, we repeat all analyses using a sample of exclusively dual-class firms in which we control 
for sample selection bias following the Heckman (1979) methodology. Lastly, in an attempt to 
further mitigate remaining concerns of endogeneity, we utilize first-difference and firm fixed 
effects regressions in extended analyses. 
Corroborating the results of prior studies (e.g., Gompers et al., 2010; Baran and Forst, 
2015), we observe a significant negative association between disproportionate insider control and 
firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q. However, across our battery of econometric approaches, 
we find a consistent, robust positive association between disproportionate control and all four of 
our accounting-based measures of firm performance as well as the Demerjian et al. (2012) measure 
of firm-efficiency.  
At first glance these findings may seem unexpected. We note however that traditional 
accounting-based measures of performance and Tobin’s Q are conceptually quite different. Annual 
earnings capture firms’ (historical) accounting based performance whereas Tobin’s Q reflects 
markets expectations and includes discounted future results. Our bifurcated findings are consistent 
with the differing incentives of entrenched insiders regarding the two. The entrenchment effect 
from holding disproportionate control rights causes insiders to be less beholden to financial 
markets and reduces their incentives for activities, for instance, voluntary disclosures, or earnings 
behavior, that are associated with increased valuation.6 In addition, because disproportionate 
                                                     
6
 For instance, Nguyen and Xu (2010) report a negative association of disproportionate insider control and earnings 
management owing to a reduced importance for entrenched insiders to meet market expectations. While not 
unanimous (Rountree et al., 2008), evidence exists that earnings management, including earnings smoothing, is valued 
by the market and in fact increases valuation in both U.S. and international contexts (Bitner and Dolan, 1996; Gaio 
and Raposo, 2011). By managing earnings to a lesser extent, firms with disproportionate control may thus adversely 
affect their market valuation. 
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control enables insiders to exercise control of the firm with a significantly reduced equity stake, 
they personally benefit less from actions that improve share price. By contrast, of course, 
entrenched insiders have incentives to increase profitability, because disproportionate control 
enables insiders to run the firm for their own benefit. Exacerbating the situation, financial markets 
may, however, disregard these performance gains as they may only increase the pool available for 
corporate waste and personal perquisites.  
The following Section 2 presents a review of relevant literature and develops our 
hypotheses. Section 3 provides details on our sample formation procedures and empirical models. 
Main results are presented in Section 4 and additional analyses in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
It is well-established that ownership structures which enable disproportionate insider 
control by allowing a divergence of voting from cash flow rights adversely affect firm value. For 
instance, Morck et al. (1988) find that firm value (measured by Tobin's Q) is positively associated 
with insider holdings for lower levels of ownership, but that the association turns negative as 
ownership increases. These findings suggest that incentive-alignment effects from cash flow rights 
owned by insiders exercise positive effects at low levels of insider ownership, but that negative 
entrenchment effects from insiders’ voting rights dominate at higher levels.  
Because control rights and economic rights are typically confounded, i.e., one share gives 
both one vote and one dividend right, several more recent studies focus on firms with ownership 
structures that enable a divergence between the voting and cash flow rights held by insiders. 
Claessens et al. (2002), for instance, find that firm value, measured by the market-to-book ratio, 
decreases as the voting rights of the largest ultimate shareholder exceed their cash flow rights in a 
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sample of East Asian firms. Relatedly, Chu et al. (2015) show that in emerging markets control-
ownership divergence also is associated with lower market liquidity.  
Using Tobin’s Q as a proxy, Lins (2003) and Barontini and Caprio (2006) provide similar 
evidence of a negative association of firm value and disproportionate control in samples of firms 
from emerging markets and continental Europe, respectively. Using samples of U.S. dual-class 
firms, Gompers et al. (2010) and Baran and Forst (2015) also find that Tobin’s Q decreases as 
disproportionate insider control increases. By and large, the observed negative association between 
disproportionate insider control and firm value has been attributed to increased agency problems 
between controlling and minority shareholders due to insiders’ enhanced ability to consume 
perquisites at the expense of outside shareholders (Masulis et al., 2009).  
While the association between disproportionate control and firm value has received much 
attention, its association with accounting-based measures of financial performance has largely 
remained unexplored. We surmise this is perhaps because Tobin’s Q is often being interpreted as 
a proxy for firm value and performance alike. However, accounting-based indicators, such as 
ROA, and Tobin’s Q capture different aspects of a firm’s financial performance. Accounting-based 
metrics capture current operating performance, whereas Tobin's Q, as a market-based metric, 
reflects the stock market’s perception of the firm’s future earnings prospects and growth 
opportunities. In addition, at a conceptual level, Tobin’s Q should include the value of intangibles 
assets not accounted for in the denominator of ROA.7  
Despite these important differences in information provided by accounting- and market-
based performance measures, we are aware of only two papers which examine the association 
between disproportionate control and traditional accounting-based measures of firm performance, 
                                                     
7
 Notably, however, intangibles are not always correctly valued by the stock market (Edmans, 2011).  
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such as ROA. Barontini and Caprio (2006) and Bozec and Laurin (2008) investigate the association 
of disproportionate control exercised by the largest ultimate shareholder and firm performance, in 
samples of continental European and Canadian firms respectively.8 The two studies provide some 
evidence for a negative association between disproportionate control and firm performance, but 
results of both are not consistently significant across alternative model specifications, econometric 
approaches and/or only hold in specific sub-cases. For instance, Bozec and Laurin (2008) do not 
find a negative association on average, but only for a sub-sample of firms characterized by high 
free cash-flows, i.e., for firms with enhanced opportunities to expropriate minority shareholders.9 
While disproportionate insider control may result in increased agency problems between 
inside and outside shareholders, leading to reduced operating performance, the net effect of 
disproportionate control on firm performance is not without ambiguity. Insiders’ motivation to 
entrench through the establishment of disproportionate control rights may stem from their desire 
to maintain long-term control over the organization. Non-financial benefits of control, such as the 
enjoyment and prestige of running one’s “own” company, however have been shown to be stronger 
motivators to improve firm performance than financial rewards alone (e.g., Bennedson et al., 
2007). At the same time, entrenched insiders’ more-intimate involvement with the firm enhances 
the effective monitoring of management (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Apart from reducing Type I 
agency costs, more effective monitoring may provide enhanced incentives for employed managers 
to improve firm performance by raising revenues and/or lowering expenses.  
                                                     
8 Bartontini and Caprio (2006) and Bozec and Laurin (2008) each examine disproportionate control of the dominant 
shareholder, regardless of whether the shareholder is an insider or outsider of the corporation, an individual, a widely 
held corporation, or a financial institution. The scope of these studies is therefore similar, but not identical, to ours, 
which is focused on disproportionate insider ownership. The identity of the owner is important because the extent of 
the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders, as well as the controlling shareholders’ incentives 
and opportunities to expropriate likely differ across different types of owners. 
9
 We explore the possible moderating effect of free cash flows on the association between disproportionate insider 
control and firm performance as part of our extended analyses. See Section 5.3. 
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The presence of insiders who exercise long-term control over the firm is also associated 
with the general benefits of stable, long-term management. For instance, due to the stabilizing 
element of committed insiders, outside parties are more likely to deal with the same management 
and same corporate strategies for an extended period (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). This constancy 
of engagement facilitates a deeper business relationship, allowing enhanced trust to build over 
time. A better relationship with improved implicit contracting is less costly than complete explicit 
contracting (Andres, 2008). Long-term relationships may allow suppliers to offer better terms. 
They also provide incentives for suppliers to invest in ways that support their customers and that 
allow those customers to operate more efficiently and profitably over time (Carr and Pearson, 
1999). Sustained relationships with lenders may also allow firms to borrow at better interest rates, 
again boosting earnings and long-term prospects (Schenone, 2010). 
Finally, disproportionate insider control drastically reduces the threat of hostile takeovers 
(Gilson, 1987; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1988). Firms with disproportionate insider control are therefore 
largely insulated from short-term market demands. Consistent with a reduced short-term 
orientation, Nguyen and Xu (2010) observe that the likelihood that a firm will just meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts declines with disproportionate insider control. A reduced short-term orientation 
is also beneficial, because firms with longer investment horizons tend to perform better than those 
with a short-term focus (Stein, 1988; 1989). Supporting this notion, Graham et al. (2005) report 
that most executives would decline a positive net present value project to avoid missing an earnings 
target, hence demonstrating a willingness to sacrifice economic value to avoid short-term adverse 
stock price reactions (and possibly harm to their longer-term personal career goals). Relatedly, 
Manso (2011) demonstrates analytically that optimal contracts to encourage innovation may be 
implemented by providing insiders insulation from the market for corporate control. Firms’ 
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capacity for innovation, in turn, is associated with increased profitability (e.g., Geroski et al., 1993; 
Roberts, 1999; Leiponen, 2000; Cefis and Ciccarelli, 2005; Love et al., 2009). 
In sum, while disproportionate insider control may exacerbate Type II agency problems 
between corporate insiders and external shareholders, an aspect emphasized by the literature 
establishing a negative association between disproportionate control and Tobin’s Q, numerous 
reasons exist that the stability of management and greater long-term focus that are arguably 
associated with enhanced insider control may also have positive consequences for firm 
performance. If managers are less preoccupied with window dressing for Wall Street, they may be 
freed to dedicate more time, attention, and resources to improving firm operations. Due to these 
competing lines of argument, the direction of the association between disproportionate insider 
control and firm performance is uncertain. We accordingly hypothesize in null form: 
H1:  Disproportionate insider control is not associated with firm performance. 
3. Models, sample selection, and descriptive statistics 
3.1. Models 
Empirically testing the effect of ownership characteristics is challenging due to the 
endogeneity of ownership structure (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 1999). The first 
problem is endogeneity in the form of correlated omitted variables. The extent of disproportionate 
insider control in a firm, i.e., the relative number of voting and cash flow rights held by insiders, 
are determined to a degree by the insiders themselves. The underlying factors influencing these 
choices however may drive firm performance, and not the extent of disproportionate insider 
control present in the firm. One example of such potentially correlated variable is industry 
affiliation (Gompers et al., 2010). Insiders of firms operating in certain industries may have a 
particular interest to exercise disproportionate control, for instance, in the media sector due to a 
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desire to be in control of the firm’s publishing policy. To the extent that firms operating in certain 
industries perform differently than the average of other companies, a link between disproportionate 
insider control and firm performance could be spurious.  
A second related concern is reverse causality. Insiders have private information regarding 
the firm’s expected future performance. These insights may lead insiders to increase (or decrease) 
the number of voting or cash flow right they hold accordingly. Because high performing firms 
hold greater potential for the consumption of perquisites and empire building, insiders have 
incentives to institute a dual-class structure and increase their disproportionate control rights, while 
the opposite is true for low performing firms. Accordingly, the direction of causality may go from 
performance to disproportionate control, and not the other way around.10  
A final concern is sample selection bias. To test our hypothesis regarding the effects of a 
separation of voting and cash flow rights on firm performance, we utilize a sample of dual-class 
firms. Our sample is therefore not randomly selected from the population of all companies. To the 
extent that dual-class firms are substantively different from single-class firms, our inferences 
therefore may not generalize to all firms. We take up each of these econometric issues in turn. 
We conduct all of our primary analyses using a matched sample of dual-class and single-
class firms which we create following the propensity score matching (PSM) procedure outlined in 
Gompers et al. (2010), Masulis et al. (2009), and McGuire et al. (2014).11 To this end, we estimate 
a probit model, based on Gompers et al. (2010), which models the decision to establish a dual-
                                                     
10
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this interpretation. 
11 PSM is useful in reducing endogeneity resulting from functional form misspecification (Shipman et al., 2017), 
decreasing the likelihood of obtaining biased coefficient estimates which may arise from traditional partial-matching 
procedures because the true relationship between control and outcome variables may differ across treatment levels or 
is other than assumed by the model utilized (Armstrong et al., 2010).  
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class structure at the time of the firm’s initial public offering as a function of various proxies for 
the salience of private benefits of control post-IPO:12  
Pr(DC) =  β0 + β1NAMEi + β2MEDIAi + β3SALESRANKi + β4PROFITRANKi + β5%FIRMSi + 
β6%SALESi + β7SALES/REGIONSALESi + βkLISTINGYEARi + βjINDUSTRYi + ε (1) 
The dependent variable DC is equal to one for firms with a dual-class structure and zero 
otherwise. The independent variables are NAME, an indicator if at IPO the firm name contains a 
person’s name; MEDIA, an indicator if the firm operated in the media industry at the time of its 
IPO; SALESRANK and PROFITRANK, the percentile rank of the firm’s sales and profits in the 
year of its IPO relative to other firms in the same IPO year; %FIRMS and %SALES, the percentage 
of all firms and all sales in the same Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) in the year immediately 
preceding the firm’s IPO; SALES/REGIONSALES, the percentage of the firm’s sales relative to the 
sales of all firms in the same CBSA in the year of its IPO; and indicator variables for the CRSP 
listing year and forty-eight Fama and French (1997) industries. 
We calculate probabilities that a firm will adopt a dual-class structure by estimating model 
(1) on an annual basis. Dual- and single-class observations are then matched without replacement 
on the closest probability of choosing a dual-class structure. This procedure creates a matched 
sample of firms with similar characteristics with the exception that one has elected a dual-class 
structure while the other has not. As a result, the concern that our results are affected by differences 
in the observable firm characteristics matched upon is mitigated (McGuire et al., 2014).  
                                                     
12
 For brevity, we refer to Gompers et al. (2010) for an explanation of the rationale of all variables included in the 
selection model. For instance, NAME represents an indicator variable reflecting if the name of the company includes 
the name of person. NAME provides a control for family firm status because family ownership is predictive of dual-
class status (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985). We include all variables identified in Gompers et al. (2010), except for 
the state anti-takeover law index variable (Gompers et al., 2003), because necessary data to construct the index are 
not available after 2006. 
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PSM, however, is not a strong control for endogeneity induced by unobservable firm-
specific characteristics. Therefore, to address the concern that omitted unobservable firm 
characteristics or reverse causality affect our analyses, we repeat our tests employing a two-stage 
least squares approach (2SLS) (Gompers et al., 2010), described in more detail in Section 4.2.13  
Finally, we control for the possible effects of sample selection bias by employing the 
Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation methodology. Following Gompers et al. (2010) and 
McGuire et al. (2014), we use the coefficient estimates from an estimation of model (1), which 
models the decision to adopt a dual-class structure, to construct an inverse Mills ratio which we 
include as a control for sample selection bias in all regressions using our dual-class only sample. 
To test our hypothesis, we estimate for firm i and year t: 
PERFit =  β0 + β1WEDGEit + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4SALEGROWTHit + β5CAPEXit + β6AGEit + 
β7MEDIAit + β8M_TO_Bit + β9GDPt + β10SP500t + βkYEARit + εit (2) 
PERF is alternatively defined as industry-adjusted ROI, ROA, ROE, and ROS: the ratio of 
income before extraordinary items to investment (long term debt and total equity), total assets, 
total equity, and sales, respectively.14 We adjust each of these measures by the industry median 
performance, where industries are defined per Fama and French (1997).15  
WEDGE measures the extent of disproportionate insider control, i.e., the separation of 
voting rights (VR) and cash-flow rights (CFR), operationalized as the ratio of VR to CFR (Khalil 
et al., 2008; Masulis et al., 2009; Jordan et al., 2014). A larger ratio represents increased voting 
                                                     
13
 As additional robustness tests, to further mitigate the concern of endogeneity, we also conduct first-difference and 
firm fixed effects regressions. See Section 5.  
14
 We use ROI as our primary performance measure because it is theoretically the best measure of a firm’s operations. 
ROA includes operating liabilities which reduce the capital needed from investors, while ROE conflates operating 
performance with capital structure (Koller et al., 2015, p. 202). We include ROS as it is the major profitability 
component of ROA.  
15
 In untabulated supplemental analyses, we alternatively use unadjusted performance measures and control for 
industry effects with industry indicator variables in all models. Results (untabulated) are not affected by these 
alternatives. 
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rights relative to cash flow rights, and hence a greater degree of disproportionate control. A 
positive (negative) and significant coefficient on WEDGE therefore indicates increased 
(decreased) firm performance as disproportionate insider control increases.16  
We control for a variety of firm characteristics related to firm performance. SIZE is defined 
as the natural log of total assets. Financial leverage, LEV, is total liabilities divided by total assets; 
SALEGROWTH is the year-over-year growth in sales (SALEt – SALEt-1)/SALEt-1. CAPEX is capital 
expenditures; AGE is firm age, defined as the number of years a company has appeared in the 
CRSP database; MEDIA is an indicator variable taking a value of one, and zero otherwise, if a 
firm-year observation is in the media industry.17 M_TO_B is the market to book ratio, the market 
value of equity divided by the book value of equity. All variables are sourced from Compustat. 
GDP is growth in real GDP from the Federal Reserve Economic Data website;18 SP500 is the 
annual return of the S&P 500 index, obtained from CRSP.  
3.2. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample construction follows Gompers et al. (2010) and consists of U.S. dual-class 
firms from 2000 to 2014. We primarily identify potential dual-class firms based on differences in 
the reported number of shares outstanding in the CRSP and Compustat databases.19 Additional 
potential dual-class firms are identified from CRSP, Thomson SDC, RiskMetrics, and Jay Ritter’s 
website.20 We also include as candidates all firms reported as dual-class firms in the Gompers et 
                                                     
16
 Following Gompers et al. (2010) and McGuire et al. (2014), we also use the difference between insider voting and 
cash flow rights as an alternate measure for the excess control rights owned by insiders. Results (untabulated) are not 
materially affected by this choice. 
17 MEDIA takes a value of one if the firm-year observation has an SIC code of the following: 2710-11, 2720-21, 2730-
31, 4830, 4832-33, 4840-41, 7810, 7812, and 7820 (Gompers et al., 2010). 
18
 https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ 
19
 CRSP reports the issue specific number of shares outstanding, while Compustat reports the number of all common 
shares outstanding. If the difference in reported shares between the two sources exceeds 1%, we include the firm as a 
potential dual-class firm in our candidate list because such difference may be attributable to the existence of a not 
publicly traded class of shares.  
20 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/dual-class-ipo.htm.  
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al. (2010) sample, which spans 1995 to 2002.21 After removing firms with foreign incorporation 
and financial firms, we use the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC) EDGAR database to 
access proxy statements and/or 10-Ks to verify the corporate structure of all candidate firms so 
identified. These procedures produce a sample which we are confident approaches the population 
of all public non-financial dual-class firms in the U.S. in this time period. In all, our dual-class 
sample comprises 591 firms which provide 4,267 firm-years of data. 
We compute the proportion of voting and cash flow rights held by insiders across all 
outstanding classes of shares for each firm-year. Data are primarily obtained from firms’ annual 
proxy statements and 10-K filings. Insiders are identified per the SEC’s reporting requirement and 
include officers and directors of the firm. We subtract options and other rights to shares if such are 
included in the reported number of shares held by insiders. Upon merging our hand-collected data 
with Compustat to obtain necessary controls, our final sample has 3,390 firm-years (484 dual-class 
firms) with non-missing values for all variables needed in our analyses. 
Descriptive statistics for our sample of dual-class companies are presented in Table 1. The 
mean industry-adjusted ROI, ROA, ROE, and ROS are -3.6 percent, -0.4 percent, -5.9 percent, and 
-9.9 percent.22 The median values are at or slightly above zero. On average, insiders control 56.9 
percent of the firm’s voting rights and 29.1 percent of its cash flow rights. The mean (median) 
value of WEDGE is 2.308 (1.998), indicating that insiders hold about twice as many voting rights 
as cash flow rights. The mean natural log of assets is 6.607, which represents an untransformed 
mean of $3.14 billion. The average firm in our sample is 17 years old, and approximately one-
sixth of firm-year observations are from the media industry. 
                                                     
21
 We thank Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick for graciously sharing their data on dual-class companies. 
22
 The average negative values are consistent with the fact that our sample period, 2000–2014, covers two recessions.  
16 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
4.  Results 
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
Figure 1 shows plots of four industry-adjusted measures of performance, ROI, ROA, ROE, 
and ROS by WEDGE tercile in our sample of dual-class firms. All four accounting-based 
performance measures monotonically increase as disproportionate insider control increases. These 
differences are statistically significant. For instance, the average ROA of the lowest tercile is 
statistically different from the highest at the one percent level (t = 7.85, p < .01). We thus observe 
initial evidence that disproportionate insider control is positively associated with firm 
performance. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
Table 2 presents results of model (1), the selection equation to create our propensity score 
matched sample of dual-class and single-class firms. We have complete data, i.e., non-missing 
values for all variables included in models (1) and (2) for 45,194 firm-year observations in the 
2000-2014 time period.23 This number includes 41,804 single-, and 3,390 (7.5%) dual-class firms. 
We observe that all variables included in the matching equation are significantly associated with 
dual-class status, except for PROFITRANK. The matched sample derived from our estimation of 
model (1) comprises 6,008 observations.24  
                                                     
23
 We make sure that all observations have complete non-missing data for the necessary variables for our primary test 
before executing the matching procedure to avoid inadvertently pairing up two firms one of which would later drop 
out of the sample due to missing values, hence creating an unbalanced matched sample. 
24
 We employ the Parsons (2001) greedy 5→1 digit matching algorithm and first match firms on five digits of the 
propensity score. Dual-class firms that do not match are next matched to single-class firms on four digits of the 
propensity score, and so on. We successfully match 88.6% of our dual-class firm observations. The remaining 
incomplete matching is due to disjointed ranges of propensity scores between dual- and single-class firms in a given 
year (Parsons, 2001).  
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In Column B of Table 2, we report the means of all matching variables as well as t-values 
of a paired t-test indicating that the matching process eliminated all significant differences between 
single- and dual-class firms with respect to the matching variables, except for a marginal remaining 
statistical difference at p < .10 (two-sided) with respect SALES/REGIONSALES and MEDIA. We 
note however that our matched sample includes a slightly larger proportion of MEDIA single-class 
firms (7.5% of single-class firms) compared to dual-class firms (6.2% of dual-class firms), which 
is opposite to the concern that an overrepresentation of dual-class firms operating in in the media 
industry may affect the results. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
We report results for model (2) using our matched sample in Table 3. The dependent 
variable in column A of Table 3 is industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q; the dependent variables reported 
in columns B through E are industry-adjusted ROI, ROA, ROE, and ROS, respectively. We 
winsorize all continuous variables at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles to mitigate the possible 
effect of outliers on the regressions. We report two-sided tests of statistical significance, calculated 
based on standard errors (Rogers) clustered at the firm level.  
Consistent with the results of prior studies (e.g., Gompers et al., 2010; Baran and Forst, 
2015), we find a significant (p < .01) negative association of disproportionate insider control and 
Tobin’s Q (Table 3, column A). However, as shown in column B, we find a positive and significant 
association of disproportionate insider control with ROI (coefficient estimate = 0.013, p < .01). 
Likewise, we find positive and significant associations of disproportionate control with ROA 
(column C, p < .05) and ROS (column E, p < .05). Our results for ROE, reported in column D, are 
weaker but consistent with prior results; the coefficient on WEDGE is positive though misses 
statistical significance at conventional levels.  
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[Insert Table 3 about here] 
In an attempt to control for confounding unobserved variables, we next conduct 2SLS 
regressions (Brown et al., 2011). In the first stage, we regress WEDGE on a set of instrumental 
variables proposed by Gompers et al. (2010).25 We then employ the predicted WEDGE from this 
first stage regression as the independent variable in the second stage regressions. Results of the 
second stage regressions are presented in Table 4. Consistent with our results reported in Table 3, 
we find that WEDGE is positively and significantly associated with all four measures of accounting 
performance (Table 4, columns B – E). We note that WEDGE continues to be negatively associated 
with Tobin’s Q, although this association is not significant (p = .22) 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Finally, to conclude our primary set of tests, we conduct in-sample tests to investigate the 
association of disproportionate insider control and firm performance within the sample of dual-
class firms. Our dual-class firm sample encompasses all 3,390 dual-class observations for which 
control variables are available. Replicating the results obtained thus far within a sample of only 
dual-class firms mitigates the concern that our finding of a positive association of disproportionate 
insider control and firm performance in the matched sample could be driven by other systematic 
differences between dual- and single-class firms.  
In addition, in the dual-class firm only sample, we are able to supplement model (2) with 
control variables related to firms’ corporate governance characteristics that we hand-collected 
                                                     
25
 These variables are NAME, MEDIA, SALESRANK, PROFITRANK, %FIRMS, %SALES, and 
SALES/REGIONSALES, along with year of appearance indicator variables, from model (1) and all control variables 
in model (2). When using a 2SLS approach, instruments should not be significantly associated with the second stage 
dependent variable(s) of interest, i.e., our case the performance measures. When we test for overidentification, we find 
that all variables except SALESRANK pass this test; i.e., are not associated with our performance measures. All of the 
remaining variables, with the exception of SALES/REGIONSALES are significantly associated with WEDGE and are 
thus retained as instruments in our first stage (results available upon request).  
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from the dual-class firms’ SEC filings.26 The first variable we add to model (2) is FAMILY, an 
indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s founder, or a direct descendent of the firm’s 
founder, has the position of chief executive officer (CEO) or chairman of the corporation. We also 
add BOARDSIZE, the number of members of the board of directions; PCT_IND, the percent of the 
board that is composed of independent directors; and CEO_IS_CHAIR, an indicator variable taking 
a value of one if the chief executive officer of the corporation is also the board chair. We also 
include the inverse Mills ratio from a first stage selection model (model 1) as a specific control for 
sample selection bias.  
Results of the in-sample tests, reported in Table 5, are consistent with our prior findings. 
Disproportionate insider control rights, WEDGE, is positively and statistically significantly 
associated with three of our four measures of firm performance (ROI, ROA, and ROS). As in Table 
3, Column D, the association with ROE is as well positive, but not statistically significant at 
conventional levels (p = .17).  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Based on these collective findings we reject H1 and conclude that disproportionate insider 
control is positively associated with firm performance. These results are robust to using a matched 
sample and in-sample tests, controlling for endogeneity and sample selection bias, respectively. 
As insiders’ voting rights exceed their cash flow rights, firm operating performance improves.  
In general, we attribute this increased performance to the positive effects that are associated 
with longer-term stable management and the enhanced ability to disregard short-term market 
pressure in favor of long-term value creating strategies. Such average positive effects of 
                                                     
26
 We hand-collected these variables from the SEC filings when gathering ownership data for our dual-class firms. 
Therefore, these variables are not available to us for the single class firms included in our matched sample of dual- 
and single-class firms. Including, or not including, the additional governance control variables does not affect the 
results reported in Table 5. 
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disproportionate insider control appear to exceed any increased agency costs engendered by such 
an arrangement. These effects are economically significant. A one-standard deviation increase in 
WEDGE results in an industry-adjusted ROI, ROA, and ROS that are higher by 2.2, 1.3, and 3.3 
raw percentage points respectively.  
Our finding that disproportionate insider control has a positive association with firm 
performance appears surprising in light of the negative association of disproportionate insider 
control and Tobin’s Q, that has been previously established by several prior studies (Claessens et 
al., 2002; Lins, 2003; Gompers et al., 2010) and that we also find. We note, however, that 
traditional accounting-based performance measures and market-based measures such as Tobin’s 
Q capture conceptually different aspects. Earnings, which define firms’ accounting based 
performance, are for the year, whereas Tobin’s Q reflects markets expectations, is therefore 
forward-looking, and includes discounted future results.  
Two complementary explanations for our robust findings appear pertinent in our specific 
context of firms with disproportionate insider control. Because disproportionate insider control 
serves as a takeover defense, which insulates insiders from the market for corporate control, 
insiders holding disproportionate control rights are less beholden to capital markets. Entrenched 
insiders have limited incentive to cater to shareholder value in terms of increased stock prices. As 
a consequence, disproportionate insider control has been found to be negatively associated with 
the amount of firm-specific information available to market participants (Jiang et al., 2014) with 
the consequence of less-accurate and more-widely dispersed financial analysts’ forecasts (Forst et 
al., 2016). Moreover, consistent with entrenched managers’ isolation from short-term market 
pressures, Nguyen and Xu (2010) also report a negative association of disproportionate insider 
control and earnings management. Accordingly, the negative association of disproportionate 
21 
 
insider control with Tobin’s Q appears consistent with fewer activities to bolster the firm’s share 
price in the presence of disproportionate insider control.  
Exacerbating the effects of insiders’ detachment from the wants and needs of the financial 
markets, Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009) find that disproportionate control is associated with 
decreasing marginal value of cash, increasing CEO compensation, and poorer investment choices. 
Accordingly, while we find that accounting performance of the firm may benefit from the 
involvement of entrenched insiders, the negative association with Tobin’s Q we find, may simply 
reflect that capital markets do not value these performance gains accordingly as these may only 
increase the pool available for corporate waste and personal perquisites.27 
5.  Additional Tests 
5.1. First-Difference and Fixed Effects Regressions 
Despite the controls for endogeneity employed in our main tests, because no perfect 
solution to the endogeneity problem exists in an archival setting, we also perform first-difference 
and fixed effects analyses to further address remaining concerns of endogeneity (Brown et al., 
2011). Both approaches eliminate the effect of correlated omitted variables that are constant over 
time. Each approach also allows for the examination of the effect of changes in disproportionate 
insider control on firm performance, and hence helps to establish a degree of causality. 
Column A of Table 6 presents the results of regressing the first-difference change in ROI 
on the change in WEDGE. The estimated coefficient on change in WEDGE is positive (0.037) and 
significant (p < .05). This result supports the findings from our levels analyses, reported in Tables 
3 through 5: as the extent of disproportionate insider control increases, firm performance increases. 
Column B of Table 6 presents the results of a fixed effects analysis. Controlling for firm fixed 
                                                     
27
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.  
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effects, WEDGE continues to be positively associated with performance (p < .10). Taken together, 
the two additional analyses reported in Table 6 demonstrate that among dual-class firms, an 
increase in disproportionate insider control is associated with improved performance. The inferred 
economic magnitude of this improvement is similar to that observed in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
5.2. Moderating Effect of Controlling Party Identity 
Our findings of a positive association of disproportionate insider control and firm 
accounting-based performance on average begs the question whether certain conditions exist in 
which the positive association of disproportionate insider control and performance may be 
particularly pronounced. As part of an extended analyses we hence examine the relative strength 
of the performance-WEDGE relationship in founder firms, “second generation firms,” in which 
control has passed from the original founder to family members and heirs, and firms where neither 
the original founder nor his or her family members are involved as executives or directors of the 
firm. Ex ante, we expect a relatively stronger link between disproportionate insider control and 
performance in founder firms, due to a founder’s superior knowledge and understanding of the 
company’s products, operations, and strategy. By contrast, in second generation firms we expect 
a weaker association between disproportionate control and firm profitability because family 
members that inherited their controlling position may possess a less-intimate knowledge of the 
business, and may be more prone to exploit their inherited control for personal gain. 
We examine this possible moderating factor by supplementing model (2) with an 
interaction term of WEDGE with indicator variables representing a founder or second generation 
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firm.28 Results (untabulated) indicate that the positive association of disproportionate insider 
control and performance is significantly decreased for second-generation firms, relative to founder 
firms and “base-line” firms that are neither founder nor second-generation firms. This suggests 
disproportionate control in the hands of founders and unrelated insiders is more beneficial for firm 
performance, possibly because inheriting family members, on average, are less adept managers 
and/or use their disproportionate control to consume perquisites at a higher rate than either 
founders or unrelated insiders. 
5.3. Impact of Free Cash Flows 
Prior research (Bozec and Laurin, 2008) suggests that the association between WEDGE 
and performance may be moderated by the presence of high free cash flows. In firms characterized 
by high free cash flow insiders have an enhanced opportunity to expropriate value from non-
controlling shareholders. The possible negative consequences of disproportionate insider control 
should therefore be particularly pronounced among firms with high free cash flows. Accordingly, 
the on-average positive performance effects of disproportionate insider control we observe may 
be confined to low free cash flow firms only where insiders’ ability to expropriate is limited and 
hence the positive effects from managerial stability dominate. 
To test the robustness of our results to the level of free cash flow, we partition our dual-
class only sample into two subsamples along the median value of free cash flow. We then repeat 
the regression analyses reported in Table 4 separately for the high and low free cash flow 
subsamples. Splitting the sample in this way does not change our inferences: in both the high and 
                                                     
28
 We define a founder firm as a firm where one of the founders is an executive officer or director of the firm, and a 
second-generation firm as a firm where none of the original founders continues to be involved as an executive officer 
or director, but one or more family members or descendants now serve as executive officers or directors. The base 
line case, hence, are non-founder, non-family firms where neither founders nor their family members or descendants 
hold positions as executives or directors. 
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low free cash flow subsamples the separation of control and cash flow rights is positively and 
significantly associated with firm performance (untabulated). 
5.4. Firm Efficiency 
Demerjian et al. (2012) note that traditional performance measures, such as ROI and ROA, 
suffer from the disadvantage of assuming that the denominators accurately capture the basis for 
which income should be scaled. For example, two firms generating equal profit but utilizing 
different amounts of capitalized assets may be viewed as having differing levels of performance, 
even if the total revenue-generating expenditures of the comparatively asset-light firm equal those 
of the comparatively asset-heavy firm.29 Instead, Demerjian et al. (2012) propose a measure of 
firm efficiency that allows firms to vary inputs, and the weights assigned to each, in the revenue 
generation process. Specifically, their measure of firm efficiency is based on data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) to model how efficiently firms generate revenues as a function of seven inputs: 
net property, plant, and equipment; net operating leases; net research and development; purchased 
goodwill; other intangibles; cost of inventory; and selling, general, and administrative expenses. 
The higher the ratio of the output (revenue) to these optimally-weighted inputs, the more efficient 
a firm is considered.30 To control for differences in technology and business models employed to 
convert inputs into outputs across industries, firm efficiency is calculated separately for each of 
the Fama and French (1997) industries (pooled across years). By construction, firm efficiency is 
bounded by zero (perfectly inefficient) and one (perfectly efficient).  
                                                     
29
 This is an acknowledged issue among finance and investment professionals, leading them to occasionally capitalize 
such items as operating leases and organic intangible investments when determining return on investment. 
30
 See Demerjian et al. (2012, pp. 1232-1238) for details regarding further specifics of DEA and the firm efficiency 
score calculation. 
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We obtain firm efficiency measures from Sarah McVay’s website.31 We regress these 
dependent variables on WEDGE while controlling for the variables shown to impact efficiency 
identified by Demerjian et al. (2012). We estimate the following model (3): 
FEi,t = β0 + β1WEDGEit + β2SIZEit + β3MKTSHRit + β4FCFIit + β5AGEit + β6SEGit + β7FCIit + ε (3) 
Firm efficiency (FE) represents the raw (RAW_FE) or industry decile-ranked 
(RANKED_FE) form of the measure. MTKSHR is firm market share, calculated as the percentage 
of sales earned by the firm within its industry; FCFI is a free cash flow indicator variable taking a 
value of one, and zero otherwise, if a firm has non-negative free cash flow, defined as operating 
cash flows less capital expenditures; SEG is the natural log of the number of business segments; 
FCI is an indicator variable equal to one, and zero otherwise, if a firm reports a non-zero foreign 
currency adjustment. All other variables are as previously defined. When the dependent variable 
is RAW_FE, we also include year and industry (Fama and French, 1997) controls in model (3).32  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
We present regression results for model (3) in Table 7. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. Because both firm efficiency (RAW_FE) and 
ranked firm efficiency (RANKED_FE) are censored with defined lower and upper bounds, we 
utilize a Tobit estimation procedure (Demerjian et al., 2012). Results reported in column A indicate 
a positive and significant association between disproportionate insider control measured by 
WEDGE and RAW_FE (p < .01). Regression results using the alternate decile-ranked form of raw 
firm efficiency (RANKED_FE), reported in column B also demonstrate a positive association (p < 
                                                     
31
 http://faculty.washington.edu/smcvay/research.html.  
32
 RANKED_FE is calculated by ranking scores within industry and as such is an industry-adjusted measure of FE. 
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.01).33 We conclude that, consistent with our findings for ROI, ROA, ROE, and ROS, firm 
performance, as measured by the Demerjian et al. (2012) firm efficiency metric, is positively 
associated with disproportionate insider control. These results further support the notion that 
disproportionate insider control on average is positively associated with firm operating 
performance.  
6.  Conclusion 
We examine the association between disproportionate insider control and firm financial 
performance. We are motivated to do so because equity structures that enable insiders to exercise 
control in excess of their economic interest in the company appear to be a growing phenomenon 
worldwide. At the same time, evidence on the relationship between disproportionate insider 
control and firm performance is very limited. The preponderance of prior work has focused on the 
association of disproportionate control and firm value (Tobin’s Q). 
Using a comprehensive hand-collected sample of U.S. dual-class firms from 2000 to 2014, 
we examine a set of four commonly used accounting-based measures of performance. Contrary to 
the limited prior work, we find robust evidence that disproportionate insider control is positively 
associated with firm performance. Our results hold in the presence of controls for endogeneity and 
sample selection bias. We further find that changes in disproportionate insider control are 
positively associated with changes in performance. Additionally, our results are consistent when 
we use firm efficiency, as calculated by Demerjian et al. (2012), as a measure of firm operating 
performance. While disproportionate insider control provides enhanced opportunity for the 
expropriation of outside shareholders, our primary findings imply that the net effect of 
disproportionate control on firm performance is positive. The positive association is consistent 
                                                     
33
 We also regress RANKED_FE on disproportionate insider control using an ordered logit regression as well as firm-
clustered OLS; inferences are unchanged (untabulated). 
27 
 
with performance-enhancing consequences of stable management, long-term term commitment, 
and focus that entrenched insiders may provide.  
Our findings of a positive association of disproportionate control and accounting-based 
performance measures contrasts with a negative relationship with the primary marked-based 
performance metric, Tobin’s Q, established in prior work and also found in our sample.34 
Disproportionate control changes the pro-rata costs and benefits of insiders’ actions. Because 
disproportionate insider control enables insiders to exercise control with a substantially reduced 
equity stake, insiders’ incentives to engage in activities to increase shareholder value in terms of 
stock price are greatly diminished. Accordingly, the decreased market valuation may be the 
consequence of a diminished importance of pleasing markets, for instance, through real or accrual-
based earnings management. Supporting the latter conjecture, Graham et al. (2005) report that 
managers are likely to underinvest for the sake of meeting earnings targets. Similarly, Nguyen and 
Xu (2010) report a negative association of disproportionate control and earnings management, 
consistent with entrenched managers’ increased isolation from market pressures. Earnings 
volatility (Hunt et al., 2000; Tucker and Zarowin, 2006) and cash flow volatility (Rountree et al., 
2008) however have been shown to be negatively associated with firms’ market valuation. Future 
research may wish to further investigate these mechanisms in light of our results. 
  
                                                     
34
 We note that a similar pattern of a positive association of insider entrenchment, as measured by the G-Index, 
Gompers et al. (2003), and firm accounting performance, but a negative association of insider entrenchment with 
Tobin’s Q, is also reported by Dybvig and Warachka (2015). Our results fall exactly along the lines of Dybvig and 
Warachka’s empirical findings: insider entrenchment, either through legal mechanisms captured by the G-Index, or 
through disproportionate insider control rights, as in our case, is positively associated with firm performance, while 
the association of insider entrenchment with Tobin’s Q is negative. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables  
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Dependent Variables        
   ROI -0.036 0.288 -2.418 -0.056 0.001 0.065 0.783 
   ROA -0.004 0.160 -1.084 -0.030 0.010 0.055 0.507 
   ROE -0.059 0.594 -3.941 -0.089 0.000 0.083 2.622 
   ROS -0.099 0.593 -4.695 -0.044 0.000 0.040 0.818 
Variables of Interest        
   VR 0.569 0.264 0.002 0.376 0.624 0.761 1.000 
   CFR 0.291 0.211 0.003 0.120 0.243 0.430 0.867 
   WEDGE 2.308 1.068 1.000 1.386 1.998 3.134 4.055 
Ownership & Corporate Governance Controls      
    FAMILY 0.687 0.463 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
    BOARDSIZE 8.599 2.385 3.000 7.000 8.000 10.000 18.000 
    PCT_IND 0.634 0.159 0.000 0.545 0.624 0.750 1.000 
    CEO_IS_CHAIR 0.556 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Firm Characteristic Controls        
    SIZE 6.607 1.684 1.512 5.477 6.635 7.661 11.274 
    LEVERAGE 0.267 0.246 0.000 0.058 0.224 0.396 1.058 
    SALEGROWTH 0.098 0.330 -0.727 -0.028 0.051 0.148 3.070 
    CAPEX 0.048 0.050 0.000 0.017 0.033 0.060 0.362 
    AGE 17.052 13.198 0.000 6.000 14.000 26.000 79.000 
    MEDIA 0.166 0.372 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
   M_TO_B 1.679 1.162 0.530 1.047 1.312 1.890 9.310 
General Economic Controls        
     GDP 0.018 0.015 -0.028 0.015 0.022 0.027 0.038 
     SP500 0.020 0.187 -0.455 -0.093 0.039 0.132 0.265 
The dual-class sample represents 3,390 firm-years (484 unique firms). Variable definitions: ROI, ROA, ROE and ROS are industry-adjusted returns on 
investment, assets, equity, and sales respectively. VR is insider voting rights; CFR is insider cash flow rights. WEDGE is the ratio of VR to CFR. FAMILY 
is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s founder or a direct descendent is CEO or chairman. BOARDSIZE is the number of members of 
the board of directions. PCT_IND is the percent of the board that is composed of independent directors. CEO_IS_CHAIR is an indicator variable taking a 
value of one if the CEO is also the board chair. SIZE is the natural log of total assets; LEV is total liabilities divided by total assets; SALEGROWTH is year-
over-year growth in sales (SALEt – SALEt-1)/SALEt-1. CAPEX is capital expenditures; MEDIA is an indicator variable taking a value of one (zero otherwise) 
if a firm-year observation is in the media industry; M_TO_B is market value of equity to book value of equity; GDP is growth in real GDP from the Federal 
Reserve Economic Data website; SP500 is the annual return in the S&P 500 index.  
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Table 2 
Propensity Score Matching Selection Equation: Probability of Adopting a Dual Class Ownership Structure 
 
 
 Column A  Column B  
 Coeff. est. Wald χ2  
Mean 
SC firms 
Mean 
DC firms 
 
t value 
 
NAME 0.245 82.85 a 0.248 0.240 0.75  
MEDIA 1.376 488.98 a 0.075 0.062 1.94 c 
SALESRANK 0.009 367.64 a 69.822 70.529 -1.09  
PROFITRANK -0.000 0.46  60.662 61.186 -0.64  
%FIRMS -2.584 8.89 a 0.034 0.034 0.33  
%SALES 2.908 21.37 a 0.041 0.040 0.55  
SALES/REGIONSALES -0.101 4.05 b 0.070 0.080 -1.80 c 
LISTINGYEAR  Included      
INDUSTRY  Included      
        
R2  0.112      
N (single-class)  41,804  3,004    
N (dual-class)  3,390   3,004   
N (all)  45,194    6,008  
Column A reports results of model (1), a probit model to obtain the probability of choosing a dual-
class structure of equity at the firm’s IPO. The dependent variable DC is equal to one for firms with 
a dual-class structure and zero otherwise. The independent variables are NAME, an indicator if at IPO 
the firm name contains a person’s name; MEDIA, an indicator if the firm operated in the media 
industry at the time of its IPO; SALESRANK and PROFITRANK, the percentile rank of the firm’s sales 
and profits in the year of its IPO relative to other firms in the same IPO year; %FIRMS and %SALES, 
the percentage of all firms and all sales in the same Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) in the year 
preceding the firm’s IPO; SALES/REGIONSALES, the percentage of the firm’s sales relative to the 
sales of all firms in the same CBSA in the year of its IPO; and indicator variables for the CRSP listing 
year and forty-eight Fama and French (1997) industries. Column B reports means of the matching 
variables for the single- (SC) and dual-class (DC) firms included in our PSM sample created based 
on the probabilities obtained from model (1). Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided tests). 
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Table 3 
Effect of Disproportionate Insider Control on Firm Performance (Matched Sample) 
 Column A 
 
Column B 
 
Column C  Column D  Column E  
Dependent Variable Tobin’s Q  ROI  ROA  ROE  ROS  
  
Coeff. 
est. 
t 
value 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t 
value 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t value  
Coeff. 
est. 
t 
value 
 Coeff. 
Est. 
t 
value 
 
     WEDGE -0.083 -3.28 a 0.013 2.85 a 0.008 2.40 b 0.007 1.03  0.021 2.32 b 
Firm characteristics controls  
             
     SIZE -0.016 -0.43  0.044 9.90 a 0.026 7.25 a 0.057 8.19 a 0.069 6.97 a 
     LEVERAGE -0.520 -2.22 b -0.227 -7.70 a -0.124 -8.11 a -0.228 -3.22 a -0.247 -3.79 a 
     SALEGROWTH 0.807 4.22 a -0.201 -0.66 
 
-0.023 -1.37  -0.045 -0.90  -0.165 -2.03 b 
     CAPEX 1.778 3.00 a 0.147 1.40  0.062 1.00  -0.106 -0.55  0.596 2.51 b 
     AGE -0.006 -3.15 a 0.001 3.96 a 0.001 4.00 a 0.002 3.05 a 0.003 4.56 a 
    MEDIA 0.269 1.55  -0.049 -2.06 b -0.048 -3.60 a -0.090 -2.06 b -0.115 -2.39 b 
     M_TO_B    0.009 0.82  0.010 1.15  0.019 1.19  -0.066 -2.48 b 
Environment Controls               
     GDP 0.102 0.51  0.027 0.91 
 
-0.010 -0.52  0.085 1.17  0.159 3.16 a 
     SP500 0.456 0.62  -0.216 -1.80 c -0.057 -0.79  -0.376 -1.21  -0.537 2.42 b 
Model F statistic  6.54 a  12.62 a  13.03 a  8.01 a  5.19 a 
Adjusted R2  0.056   0.094 
 
 0.112   0.039   0.085  
N  6,008   6,008   6,008   6,008   6,008  
The dependent variables are Tobin’s Q, ROI, ROA, ROE, and ROS, industry-adjusted returns on investment, assets, equity, and sales 
respectively. WEDGE is the divergence of insider voting rights from cash flow rights computed as the ratio of VR to CFR; VR is the proportion 
of voting rights owned by insiders; CFR is the proportion of dividend rights owned by insiders. Other variables are defined in Table 1. Test 
statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors (Rogers) clustered at the firm level. Letters a, b, and c denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided tests). 
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Table 4 
Effect of Disproportionate Insider Control on Firm Performance (Matched Sample): 2SLS Analysis 
 Column A 
 
Column B 
 
Column C  Column D  Column E  
Dependent Variable Tobin’s Q  ROI  ROA  ROE  ROS  
  
Coeff. 
est. 
t 
value 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t 
value 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t value  
Coeff. 
est. 
t 
value 
 Coeff. 
Est. 
t 
value 
 
     WEDGE -0.557 -1.23  0.238 3.36 a 0.179 3.42 a 0.479 4.23 a 0.481 2.10 b 
Firm characteristics controls  
             
     SIZE -0.012 -0.32  0.042 9.34 a 0.024 6.78 a 0.051 7.13 a 0.063 6.10 a 
     LEVERAGE -0.503 -2.12 b -0.229 -7.71 a -0.125 -8.05 a -0.225 -3.19 a -0.248 -3.87 a 
     SALEGROWTH 0.802 4.20 a -0.019 -0.61 
 
-0.022 -1.30  -0.042 -0.84  -0.162 -2.00 b 
     CAPEX 1.764 2.97 a 0.186 1.71 c 0.094 1.46  -0.106 -0.01  0.681 2.73 a 
     AGE -0.006 -2.75 a 0.001 2.97 a 0.001 2.79 a 0.001 1.70 c 0.003 3.67 a 
    MEDIA 0.346 2.22 b -0.083 -3.44 a -0.074 -5.40 a -0.159 -3.62 a -0.183 -3.60 a 
     M_TO_B    0.011 0.95  0.011 1.29  0.023 1.42  -0.063 -2.43 b 
Environment Controls               
     GDP 0.085 0.43  0.029 1.00 
 
-0.008 -0.44  0.087 1.20  0.163 3.26 a 
     SP500 0.506 0.69  -0.229 -1.92 c -0.066 -0.92  -0.395 -1.28  -0.562 -2.53 b 
Model F statistic  5.54 a  13.45 a  14.29 a  9.05 a  5.37 a 
Adjusted R2  0.054   0.096 
 
 0.116   0.042   0.087  
N  6,008   6,008   6,008   6,008   6,008  
The dependent variables are Tobin’s Q, ROI, ROA, ROE, and ROS, industry-adjusted returns on investment, assets, equity, and sales 
respectively. WEDGE is the divergence of insider voting rights from cash flow rights computed as the ratio of VR to CFR; VR is the proportion 
of voting rights owned by insiders; CFR is the proportion of dividend rights owned by insiders. Other variables are defined in Table 1. Test 
statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors (Rogers) clustered at the firm level. Letters a, b, and c denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided tests). 
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Table 5 
Effect of Disproportionate Insider Control on Firm Performance (Dual-class Sample) 
 Column A 
 
Column B Column C  Column D  Column E  
Dependent Variable Tobin’s Q  ROI ROA  ROE
 
 ROS  
  
Coeff. 
est. 
t 
value 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t 
value 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t 
value 
 
Coeff. 
est. 
t 
value 
 
Coeff. 
est. 
t 
value 
 
     WEDGE -0.071 -1.58 
 
0.021 3.04 a 0.012 2.42 b 0.015 1.39  0.031 1.78 c 
Ownership & Corporate Governance Controls         
    FAMILY 0.072 0.74  0.036 2.10 b 0.014 1.35  0.017 0.62  0.076 2.02 b 
    BOARDSIZE 0.028 1.64  -0.004 -1.24  -0.003 -1.34  -0.004 -0.91  -0.017 -2.60 a 
    PCT_IND 0.500 1.50  -0.165 -3.41 a -0.095 -2.80 a -0.102 -1.23  -0.290 -2.53 b 
    CEO_IS_CHAIR -0.089 -0.90  0.033 2.30 b 0.014 1.26  0.019 0.81  0.056 1.89 c 
Firm Characteristics               
     SIZE -0.020 -0.36 
 
0.039 5.27 a 0.024 3.91 a 0.048 4.31 a 0.074 4.85 a 
     LEVERAGE -0.777 -3.67 a -0.251 -6.99 a -0.130 -6.59 a -0.189 -2.18 b -0.386 -4.30 a 
     SALEGROWTH -0.843 3.05 a -0.057 -1.40  -0.044 -1.90 c -0.115 -1.57  -0.211 -2.08 b 
     CAPEX 2.201 2.28 b 0.145 0.80  0.026 0.24  -0.142 -0.48  0.305 0.76  
     AGE -0.009 -2.45 b 0.001 1.30  0.001 1.79 c 0.002 2.04 b 0.002 1.98 b 
    MEDIA 0.209 1.14 
 
-0.060 -2.00 b -0.034 -1.86 c -0.100 -2.00 b -0.194 -2.66 a 
     M_TO_B    -0.001 -0.03  0.007 0.46  0.023 0.90  -0.081 -2.07 b 
Environment Controls               
     GDP 0.309 1.58 
 
0.014 0.40  -0.016 0.70  -0.001 -0.00  0.155 2.27 b 
     SP500 -0.037 -0.06 
 
-0.063 -0.53  0.020 0.25  -0.059 -0.12  -0.405 -1.43  
Selection control  
 
            
     INVMILLS 0.077 0.57  -0.057 -3.02 a -0.023 -1.54  -0.091 -3.42 a -0.184 -2.66  
Model F statistic  2.89 a  5.61   5.62 a  3.26 a  3.05 a 
Adjusted R2  0.111 
 
 0.111   0.116   0.034   0.143  
N  3,390 
 
 3,390   3,390   3,390   3,390  
The dependent variables are Tobin’s Q and ROI, ROA, ROE, and ROS, industry-adjusted returns on investment, assets, equity, and sales respectively. WEDGE 
is the divergence of insider voting rights from cash flow rights computed as the ratio of VR to CFR; VR is the proportion of voting rights owned by insiders; 
CFR is the proportion of dividend rights owned by insiders. FAMILY is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s founder or a direct descendent 
of the firm’s founder has the position of chief executive officer (CEO) or chairman of the corporation. BOARDSIZE is the number of members of the board 
of directions; PCT_IND is the percent of the board that is composed of independent directors; and CEO_IS_CHAIR is an indicator variable taking a value of 
one if the chief executive officer of the corporation is also the board chair. Other variables are defined in Table 2. Test statistics and significance levels are 
calculated based on standard errors (Rogers) clustered at the firm level. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
(two-sided tests). 
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Table 6 
Effect of Disproportionate Insider Control on Firm Performance: First-Difference and Fixed Effects 
Models 
 First-Difference Fixed Effects 
 Column A 
 
    Column B  
Dependent Variable ROI     ROI  
 Coeff. 
est. 
t value 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t value 
 
     WEDGE 0.037 2.35 b 0.020 1.94 c 
Ownership & Corporate Governance Controls      
    FAMILY 0.001 0.04  0.059 2.13 b 
    BOARDSIZE -0.005 -0.88  0.001 0.00  
    PCT_IND -0.075 -0.99  -0.121 -2.14 b 
    CEO_IS_CHAIR 0.020 1.01  0.005 0.34  
Firm Characteristics      
     SIZE 0.134 5.91 a 0.066 5.55 a 
     LEVERAGE -0.771 -13.38 a -0.381 -9.65 a 
     SALEGROWTH 0.061 3.99 a 0.018 1.11  
     CAPEX -0.645 -4.18 a -0.271 -1.93 c 
     AGE 0.023 4.31 a -0.003 -1.83 c 
    MEDIA -0.267 -2.73 a -0.108 -2.05 b 
    M_TO_B 0.009 1.01  0.027 4.11 a 
       
R2  0.100 
 
 0.433  
N  2,906 
 
 3,299  
Results in Column A are obtained using the year-over-year change in the indicated dependent 
and independent variables, computed as the variable value in year t less the value in year t-1. 
Results in Column B reflect the inclusion of firm fixed effects. These firm variables are included 
in regressions but omitted from this table. The dependent variable is ROI, industry-adjusted 
return on investment. WEDGE is the divergence of insider voting rights from cash flow rights 
computed as the ratio of VR to CFR; VR is the proportion of voting rights owned by insiders; 
CFR is the proportion of dividend rights owned by insiders. Other variables are defined in Table 
1. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided 
tests). 
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Table 7 
Effect of Disproportionate Insider Control on Firm Performance: Firm Efficiency Models 
 
 
 Tobit Estimation Tobit Estimation 
   
 Column A 
 
Column B  
Dependent Variable RAW_FE  RANKED_FE  
 Coeff. est. t value 
 Coeff. 
est. 
t value 
 
     WEDGE 0.003 3.60 a 0.005 2.87 a 
Firm Characteristics      
     SIZE 0.038 23.09 a 0.068 22.69 a 
     MKTSHR 1.747 15.72 b 2.056 9.00 a 
     FCFI 0.030 5.90 a 0.114 11.32 a 
     AGE -0.001 -4.43 a -0.001 -2.65 a 
     SEG -0.010 -2.78 a 0.003 0.83  
     FCI 0.024 4.28 a 0.059 5.63 a 
Selection control  
 
   
     INVMILLS -0.008 -1.38  0.049 6.65 a 
Year Controls?  Yes   Yes  
Additional Industry Controls?  Yes   No  
Adj. R2  0.346 
 
 0.278  
N  3,443 
 
 3,443  
The dependent variable in Column A is RAW_FE, the raw firm efficiency score; the dependent 
variable in Column B is RANKED_FE, the decile-ranked form of RAW_FE, ranked by industry. 
WEDGE is the divergence of insider voting rights from cash flow rights computed as the ratio of 
VR to CFR; VR is the proportion of voting rights owned by insiders; CFR is the proportion of 
dividend rights owned by insiders. MTKSHR is firm market share, calculated as the percentage of 
sales earned by the firm within its industry; FCFI is a free cash flow indicator variable taking a 
value of one (zero otherwise) if a firm has non-negative free cash flow (cash flow from operations 
less capital expenditures); SEG is the natural log of business segments; FCI is an indicator variable 
equal to one (zero otherwise) if a firm reports a non-zero foreign currency adjustment value. Other 
variables are defined in Table 2. The adjusted R2 in Columns A and B is generated from the OLS 
form of the model. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively (two-sided tests). 
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Figure 1 
Industry-Adjusted Firm Performance by Disproportionate Insider Control Tercile 
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